DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
OPNAVINST 3440.15A
N411C
30 May 1997

OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3440.15A

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF NAVY NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE MANAGEMENT

Ref: (a) DoD Directive 3150.8, DoD Response to Radiological Accidents of 13 Jun 96 (NOTAL)
(b) DoD Directive 5230.16, Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs Guidance of 20 Dec 93 (NOTAL)
(c) DoD Directive 5100.52-M, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP) Sep 90 (NOTAL)
(d) OPNAVINST 3440.16C, Navy Civil Emergency Management Program (NOTAL)
(e) OPNAVINST 5510.1H, Department of the Navy Information and Personnel Security Program Regulation
(f) OPNAVINST 5721.1E, Release of Information on Nuclear Weapons and on Nuclear Capabilities of U.S. Forces (NOTAL)
(g) DoD Directive 5200.8, Security of Installations and Resources of 25 Apr 91 (NOTAL)
(h) SECNAVINST 5511.36A, Authority of Military Commanders Under the Internal Security Act of 1950 to Issue Security Orders and Regulations for the Protection and Security of Property and Places Under Their Command, 21 Jul 92
(i) Navy Special Weapons Ordnance Publication (SWOP) C20-11, General Firefighting Guidance (U) (NOTAL)
(j) NAVMEDCOMINST 6470.10, Initial Management of Irradiated or Radioactively Contaminated Personnel (NOTAL)
(k) NAVMED P-5055, Radiation Health Protection Manual (NOTAL)
(l) OPNAVINST 8110.18A, Department of the Navy Nuclear Weapon Safety Program (NOTAL)
(m) OPNAVINST C8126.1A, Navy Nuclear Weapon Security (U) (NOTAL)
(n) OPNAVINST 1601.7 G, Navy Crisis Management Organization (NOTAL)
(o) Joint Staff Memorandum MJCS 157-89, Joint Nuclear Accident/Incident Response Team (NOTAL)
(p) OPNAVINST 3100.6 G, Special Incident Reporting (OPREP-3, Navy Blue and Unit SITREP) Procedures

(q) Special Weapons Ordnance Publication 25-2, Naval Atomic Planning, Support, and Capabilities - "NAPSAC" (NOTAL)
(r) DNA 5100.52.1L, Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing (NARCL) of March 1995 (NOTAL)

Encl: (1) Public Affairs Requirements
(2) Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC)
(3) Logistics Support Guidance
(4) Security Guidance
(5) General Firefighting Guidance
(6) Decontamination Guidance
(7) Legal Requirements
(8) Nuclear Weapon Accident and Significant Incident Planning and Response Guidance

1. Purpose. To implement references (a), (b), and (c) and to issue Department of Navy (DON) policy and minimum standards, criteria, and consequence management actions to be employed when preparing for, mitigating, and responding to accidents or significant incidents involving nuclear weapons and/or nuclear weapon components. This instruction is a complete revision and should be reviewed in its entirety.

2. Cancellation. OPNAVINST 3440.15.

3. Definitions. For the purpose of this instruction, the definitions in reference (c) apply.

4. Scope. The responsibilities and procedures in this instruction and reference (c) apply to all DON activities, afloat and ashore, when preparing for and responding to an accident or incident involving nuclear weapons and/or nuclear weapons components.

5. Background. DON is responsible for the security, safe handling, storage, maintenance, assembly, and transport of nuclear weapons and nuclear components in DON custody. This responsibility includes the requirement to protect personnel and property from any health or safety hazards that may result from an accident involving nuclear weapons. Further, reference (a) requires the services to develop and exercise nuclear weapon accident operational plans and procedures. Reference (a) also specifies that the Unified Combatant Commanders are responsible for the direction and coordination of Department of Defense (DoD) response actions.

6. Discussion

a. Nuclear weapons and associated components are designed to be safe to handle, store and maintain in all normal environments expected to be encountered throughout the Stockpile-to-Target Sequence; however, the possibility exists that an unexpected event or abnormal environment could result in a weapon accident. Therefore, operational plans and procedures must be made and exercised to deal with a credible accident scenario.

b. Reference (c) contains guidance for preparing for and responding to a nuclear weapons accident. It provides the Initial Response Force/Response Task Force (IRF/RTF) Commander and his staff with a comprehensive source of guidance and technical information and assigns responsibilities to all agencies involved in a nuclear weapons accident response.

c. Reference (d) provides DON policy, planning guidance and operational structure and assigns responsibility for assisting civil and foreign authorities in the event of a disaster. Since a nuclear weapon accident has the potential for serious consequences, the basic policy and guidance of reference (d), as amplified by this instruction and reference (c), will apply. The Federal Response Plan (FRP) and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) provide extensive information concerning the Federal response to radiological or nuclear emergencies. It is DoD policy to provide resources, as outlined in these plans and consistent with operational availability, to assist Federal, State and local responses to radiological emergencies.

7. Policy

a. While it is U. S. policy to neither confirm nor deny (NCND) the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any general or specific location, the preparation and response to a nuclear weapon accident requires additional guidance beyond NCND. To conduct discussions necessary to prepare coordinated emergency plans, provisional security clearances must be provided to selected Federal, State, and local officials in advance of an accident or incident. Access authorization may be requested for such planning from Chief of Naval Operations (N09N2) per reference (e), via the chain of command. Further guidance is contained in references (c) and (f). In the event of an accident, if classified information on the presence of nuclear weapons must be released to effectively execute emergency plans, Fleet Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and designated response force commanders are to coordinate with cleared Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), State, and local officials. In all cases, public release of information shall be in accordance with references (b) and (c) and the general public affairs requirements in enclosure (1).

b. Within the United States, its territories, and possessions, and within national security constraints and the guidance above, commanders designated by the Fleet CINC, in conjunction with the Unified Combatant Commander, shall cooperate with FEMA in developing contingency plans with State and local governments for responding to a nuclear weapon accident at appropriate facilities within their area of responsibility (AOR). Planning shall be per this instruction and reference (d).

c. For a nuclear weapon accident outside the United States, its territories, and possessions, DON commanders shall comply with the direction of the Unified Combatant Commander who will coordinate activities with the Department of State (DOS). DOS will exercise diplomatic and political control of a U.S. response. Classified technical information on nuclear weapons or other military nuclear equipment is not authorized for dissemination to foreign officials. Any release of nuclear weapons information to foreign governments shall be per references (c) and (f).

d. In the event of an accident or incident involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components in Navy custody, the commanding officer of the command having custody must evaluate the situation and make a judgment as to whether the requirements of this directive apply. If he determines that the accident or incident is, or has the potential to become, a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident, he must initiate nuclear weapon accident response measures. The commanding officer shall notify the designated IRF Commander, and shall serve as the immediate on-scene commander until relieved by the IRF Commander.

e. The commander of a Fleet CINC-designated IRF nearest to a nuclear weapon accident shall establish military control at the accident site. The IRF shall perform emergency operations to establish command and control and security and provide humanitarian support. Further, the IRF Commander shall coordinate emergency operations with civil authorities and shall remain in charge of the accident site until relieved by the RTF Commander.

f. The RTF Commander shall have the authority to task those naval activities in his designated AOR for nuclear weapon accident response, as necessary.

g. The National Military Command Center (NMCC), supported by the Joint Nuclear Accident Incident Response Team (JNAIRT) and Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC), coordinates the mobilization of all specialized national response assets and deploys them to a nuclear weapon accident. If the RTF Commander determines that such assets are not needed, he will inform the NMCC and the Unified Combatant Commander, when appropriate, to terminate the support call up. The on-scene commander may also request additional assets as required. Responsibilities and service requirements to support the JNACC are contained in enclosure (2).

h. Preparation and training in response to a nuclear weapon accident should be accomplished within the existing Fleet and designated activities' organizational structure drawing from (1) existing Fleet damage control structure afloat; (2) civil disaster preparedness planning structure ashore in the United States, its territories, and possessions; and (3) foreign disaster preparedness structure for areas outside U.S. control.

i. Response to nuclear weapon accidents shall be included as part of normal Fleet damage control and shore-based disaster preparedness plans.

8. Responsibilities. As specified in reference (a), the Secretary of the Navy is responsible for the maintenance of initial response forces, based upon Navy requirements and capabilities, to deal with the effects of a radiological accident. Consequently, Fleet CINC-designated commanders shall be prepared to assume immediate control at the scene of a nuclear weapon accident, initiate emergency actions as necessary to minimize the initial impact of such events, and maintain control over classified material. Accordingly, the following responsibilities and relationships are assigned:

a. General

(1) As outlined in reference (d) and within Fleet operating structures, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), and Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) are responsible to their respective Unified Combatant Commander for incorporating into Fleet Readiness Planning and Civil Disaster and Foreign Assistance Planning, as applicable, guidance and procedures for responding to an accident or significant incident involving nuclear weapons. As specified in reference (a), these forces shall be capable of providing support commensurate with the potential for an accident during respective theater nuclear weapon deployment. Navy and Marine Corps components of the response forces will be comprised of available DON assets within the AOR.

(2) If a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident occurs within the United States, its possessions, or territories, but beyond the boundaries of a Federal installation, primary command responsibility for control at the scene rests with the service or agency having physical possession of the nuclear weapon or nuclear component at the time of the accident or incident. An appropriate representative of the service or agency that has primary command responsibility will designate a National Defense Area (NDA) as soon as possible to protect nuclear weapons or components under these circumstances. Authority for declaration of an NDA is contained in reference (g) as issued by reference (h).

(3) Activities requested to respond or provide assistance to a nuclear weapon accident will fund logistic costs initially incurred from within existing resources. The military service or agency having possession of the nuclear weapon or component at the time of the accident is responsible for reimbursing, upon request, the military service providing the assistance or response. Enclosure (3) and references (a) and (c) provide additional guidance on funding, planning, and resource matters peculiar to nuclear weapon accident logistics.

(4) Security will be established by the first forces arriving at the scene of a nuclear weapon accident or incident within the limits of their capabilities. Follow-on forces of the IRF and RTF will solidify the site security posture in accordance with the provisions of enclosure (4) and reference (c).

(5) Firefighting will be conducted in accordance with enclosure (5), references (c), and (i). For accidents/incidents occurring outside Federal boundaries, it is probable that civil law enforcement and firefighting agencies will be the first on the scene. It is essential, therefore, that an on-scene military presence be established quickly to advise these agencies of potential hazards.

(6) Nuclear Emergency Team Operations (NETOPS) including, as a minimum, contamination control, personnel monitoring and decontamination shall be started at the accident site as soon as possible to minimize the spread of radiological contamination. Enclosure (6) and references (c), (j), and (k) provide procedures to be implemented by qualified response personnel.

(7) Once emergency conditions have stabilized, the RTF Commander, on behalf of the DON, will initiate action to continue operations leading to site restoration as outlined in reference (c).

b. Specific

(1) Chief of Naval Operations. Consistent with references (a) and (l), the CNO staff will support the DON Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Program within their functional areas of responsibility as follows:

(a) The Special Assistant for Naval Investigative Matters and Security (N09N)

1. Provide guidance, policy, procedures, and standards for the physical security of nuclear weapons involved in an accident per reference (m).

2. Provide a member to the Nuclear Weapon Accident/Incident Crisis Response Team in accordance with reference (n).

(b) The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) (Plans, Policy, and Operations) (N3/N5)

1. Serve as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) single point of contact to the Joint Staff for matters involving Navy nuclear weapons (N514).

2. Advise the Joint Staff in matters pertaining to command of the Navy operating forces responding to a nuclear weapon accident (N51, N311).

3. Provide a member to JNAIRT in accordance with reference (o) (N514).

4. Direct an OPNAV staff Nuclear Weapon Accident/Incident Crisis Response Team in accordance with reference (h) for facilitating the coordination of interservice and agency response forces in support of senior DON, DoD, and national authorities. Respond to requests from the JNAIRT (N51, N311).

5. Provide command and control support to maintain required communications between the IRF or RTF Commander, Unified Combatant Commander, Navy Command Center (NCC), and Joint Staff during a nuclear weapons accident (N312).

(c) The DCNO (Logistics) (N4)

1. Provide overall policy, guidance, and procedures to the CNO for the Navy and Marine Corps Nuclear Weapon Accident/Incident Response Program (N41).

2. Promote a high state of accident response readiness, maintain liaison with other services and agencies, and keep DON commanders informed of advances in technology and changes in procedures pertaining to an accident involving a nuclear weapon or nuclear component (N41).

3. Provide members to the Nuclear Weapon Accident/Incident Crisis Response Team in accordance with reference (n) (N41, N45). Coordinate with N311 and N514 to ensure proper crisis team membership (N41).

4. Advise nuclear weapon resource sponsors (N87) of requirements to ensure nuclear weapons accident readiness is maintained (N41).

5. Provide a member to the JNAIRT in accordance with reference (o) (N41).

(d) The Director, Submarine Warfare Division (N87)

1. Provide resources necessary to ensure readiness for nuclear weapon accident response is maintained for their respective weapon systems.

2. Provide members to the Nuclear Weapon Accident/Incident Crisis Response Team in accordance with reference (n) (N871, N872).

(e) The Director of Space and Electronic Warfare (N6). Coordinate and support emergency communication planning, including acquisition of mobile, modular, communications packages, to meet emergency operational requirements. Coordinate with Fleet Commanders to ensure nuclear weapon accident communications requirements are consistent and integrated into Navy and Fleet communications planning.

(2) Commandant of the Marine Corps. Provide for attaining and maintaining, consistent with operational requirements and personnel and equipment constraints, the capability within the Fleet Marine Forces, bases, and stations to provide initial response to, and appropriate support for, nuclear weapon accidents or incidents occurring both inside and outside Federal boundaries.

(3) Chief of Naval Education and Training. Coordinate or provide standardized training in nuclear weapon and radiological safety, security, radiation detection and monitoring, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), damage control, firefighting, decontamination, and disposal of radioactive waste materials.

(4) Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery

(a) Provide technical guidance on the medical aspects of radiation hazards associated with nuclear weapon-related accidents.

(b) Develop procedures for the medical treatment of contaminated personnel and mass casualties. Provide assistance and technical guidance for identifying and locating facilities for the treatment of contaminated personnel.

(c) Establish radiation protection standards and provide information on the biological effects of radiation.

(d) Train medical personnel in the provisions of references (j) and (k) for the treatment of irradiated or radioactively contaminated personnel.

(e) Provide guidance to medical personnel on the priorities of treatment for critical, serious, and minor injuries as they apply to a nuclear weapon accident.

(f) Establish and maintain appropriate Mobile Medical Augmentation Readiness Teams (MMARTs).

(g) Provide technical guidance on the decedent affairs aspects of nuclear accidents and incidents.

(h) Advise organizations responsible for the development of equipment for radiation protection, decontamination, and protection.

(5) Chief of Information

(a) Ensure that Navy public affairs guidance is coordinated with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)) to ensure conformance with established national policy.

(b) Provide public affairs guidance consistent with the policies outlined in references (b) and (c) and enclosure (1) to appropriate commands for use in planning for and responding to public queries and actions resulting from a nuclear accident.

(c) Provide a member to the Nuclear Weapons Accident/Incident Crisis Response Team in accordance with reference (n).

(6) Judge Advocate General

(a) Serve as Principal Legal Advisor (PLA) in preparing for and responding to an accident involving a nuclear weapon and/or nuclear weapon component.

(b) Through Commander, Naval Legal Service Command, or General Counsel, as necessary, provide appropriate commands with legal guidance consistent with enclosure (7) and reference (c) to be used in the event of a nuclear weapon accident.

(c) Provide members to the Nuclear Weapons Accident/Incident Crisis Response Team in accordance with reference (n) (JAG-11, 13 and 35).

(d) Coordinate legal advice with the General Counsel concerning compliance with public law.

(7) Supporting Commanders

(a) Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command

1. Maintain technical advisors and provide technical guidance and advice in areas of radiological monitoring, decontamination, and contaminated material disposal.

2. Provide technical assistance, guidance, and personnel to establish a Navy Radiological Control (RADCON) Team, on an "as-needed" or "when-requested" basis, from available assets.

3. Provide a Navy Radiation Health Officer or civilian Health Physicist (GS-13/14/15) to serve as Director of the Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC). Enclosure (8) (annex (C)) discusses the operations and functions of the JHEC.

4. Procure, maintain, and distribute required radiation detection and monitoring equipment.

(b) Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command

1. Provide civil engineering support equipment requirements for response to a nuclear weapon accident or incident.

2. Provide DoD Resource Database (DoDRDB) to RTF Commanders.

(c) Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (COMSPAWARSYSCOM)

1. Provide primary technical advice and assistance to Navy and Marine Corps forces, ashore and afloat, on the employment of emergent portable communications systems capable of providing secure voice, record copy, and satellite communication capabilities.

2. Identify portable communications equipment available within the services, Department of Energy (DOE), and civil agencies.

(8) Director, Strategic Systems Programs (DIRSSP). Provide technical assistance and advice to the CNO and subordinate commands and forces ashore and afloat for assigned weapon

systems. Define credible nuclear weapon and other radiological accidents for training and exercise purposes. DIRSSP will:

(a) Ensure Strategic Weapons Facilities (SWFs) prepare nuclear weapon accident response plans.

(b) Designate initial on-scene commanders for nuclear weapon accidents or significant incidents involving the SWFs.

(c) Provide policy guidance to SWF Commanders concerning preparatory accident planning in support of nuclear weapon handling, maintenance, and logistic operations. This guidance should include, but is not limited to, the provisions of reference (c).

(d) Ensure that training of response forces includes, as a minimum, the Senior Officer Nuclear Accident Course (SONAC) for SWF Commanders and appropriate staff. NETOPS training also should be provided to appropriate SWF personnel. Information concerning available training courses is provided in reference (c).

(e) Ensure that SWF nuclear weapon accident/incident exercises are conducted at least quarterly.

(f) Ensure that SWF initial on-scene commanders assume command and control responsibilities, until relieved by the IRF Commander, for Navy components during a nuclear accident involving a Navy nuclear weapon within the SWF. Ensure that the SWF initiates appropriate reports to the NMCC, Unified Combatant Commander, and NCC in accordance with reference (p).

(g) Task the SWFs to provide technical, administrative, and personnel support to the IRF and RTF, as required, to complete accident response and site restoration.

(9) Program Executive Officer, Cruise Missile and Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (PEO(CU)). Provide technical assistance and advice to the CNO and subordinate commands and forces ashore and afloat for assigned weapon systems. Define credible nuclear weapon and other radiological accident scenarios that should be exercised for training and exercise purposes.

(10) Fleet Commanders in Chief

(a) Ensure appropriate operational nuclear weapon platforms and storage sites designated in reference (q) and other activities specifically assigned a nuclear weapon accident response mission prepare nuclear weapon accident plans. The listing of designated response activities must be coordinated with, and provided to, the appropriate Unified Combatant Commander (copy to CNO (N41)), in accordance with reference (a).

(b) Designate appropriate shore IRF Commanders for nuclear weapon accidents/incidents. For an accident afloat, the IRF Commander is the commanding officer or embarked flag officer and need not be specifically designated. Nuclear certified activities and those units in Fleet CINC nuclear force regeneration plans are generally those required to maintain an IRF. The listing of IRF Commanders will be provided to the responsible Unified Combatant Commander with a copy furnished to CNO (N41). Responsibilities for IRFs are contained in reference (c). Afloat IRFs will be comprised of unit personnel and will have capabilities tailored to their existing damage control organization. A nominal ashore IRF is provided in enclosure (8) (annex (A)).

(c) Designate an O7 or above to serve as the commander of the theater RTF for Navy nuclear weapon accidents within the geographical AOR. The selection of the RTF Commander will be coordinated with the responsible Unified Combatant Commander, as specified in reference (a). Once approved, provide CNO (N41) with the title of the RTF Commander. Definitions and responsibilities for RTFs are contained in reference (c). An example of a nominal ashore RTF is provided in enclosure (8) (annex (B)).

(d) Provide policy guidance to IRF and RTF Commanders and subordinate commands concerning preparatory accident planning in support of nuclear weapon handling and logistic movements. This guidance should be consistent with the provisions of reference (c) and the emergency management authority to coordinate with regional and area resources provided by reference (d).

(e) The RTF Commander shall have the authority to task regional naval activities to support RTF operations.

(f) Provide for training of response forces including, as a minimum, the Flag Officer Nuclear Accident Course (FONAC) for RTF Commanders; SONAC for shore IRF Commanders; Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal (JEOD) course for EOD detachments supporting RTFs, IRFs, and storage sites; and NETOPS training for emergency responders and designated members of the EOD detachment from each nuclear weapon storage site. Attendance at SONAC is also encouraged for appropriate shore executive officers (XOs) and emergency management officers (EMOs). Information concerning available training courses is provided in reference (c).

(g) Exercise the elements that support the RTF, at least annually. At a minimum, exercises are to consist of a Command Post Exercise (CPX), including all aspects of enclosure (8) and reference (c) with the involvement of, at their discretion, NMCC/NCC, DoD, other Federal agency, and State and local governments. National-level RTF field training exercises (FTXs), including all aspects of emergency response, shall be conducted at least every 5 years, as coordinated by the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA). A 1-year schedule of all response force exercises will be provided to CNO (N4l) by July of each year.

(h) Ensure appropriate RTF and IRF commanders maintain a listing of cleared FEMA (regional) and State representatives to facilitate emergency management planning and coordination.

(i) Coordinate communication requirements for nuclear weapon accident response within the AOR and ensure planning is consistent with Fleet/Navy communication planning. Ensure that communications facilities and equipment are sufficient to provide voice and record communications, secure (STU III, DES) voice, and photographic picture capability when possible, between an accident scene and the NMCC, NCC, and other pertinent commands and agencies.

(j) Provide notification to RTFs and IRFs of all CINC-directed nuclear weapon movements in or through their AOR.

(k) Assume command and control responsibilities, as directed by the appropriate Unified Combatant Commander, for Navy components during a nuclear accident involving a Navy nuclear weapon within their AOR and initiate appropriate accident investigations. Naval Command and Control reporting will follow the normal joint reporting structure to the NMCC, Unified Combatant Commander, and NCC.

(l) Provide support to the accident scene, as required by the RTF Commander.

(m) Maintain capabilities of RTFs including identification of sufficient funds to support requirements.

(11) Commanders Outside the United States. Components of Unified Combatant Commands will comply with the nuclear accident plans of the Unified Combatant Commander to which they are assigned.

(12) Response Task Force (RTF) Commanders

(a) Establish nuclear weapon accident plans as part of emergency management planning to be used by activities and units within the AOR assigned by the CINC. This guidance should:

1. Include, but not limited to, the provisions of enclosure (8) and reference (c).

2. Identify all regional forces and resources capable of responding to or being employed in response to a nuclear weapon accident. An example of a nominal RTF is provided in enclosure (8) (annex (B)) as a guide. The RTF's JHEC is discussed in enclosure (8) (annex (C)).

3. Outline procedures and discuss coordination with State and local governments within their AOR.

(b) Perform duties per enclosure (8) and reference (c).

(c) Serve as the principal DON interface between FEMA and State authorities within their respective AOR for nuclear weapon accident response planning.

(d) Maintain a trained and qualified staff to perform the functions addressed here and in reference (c) including directors for operations and support, radiation health and medical officers, EOD, NETOPS, legal and public affairs, security assistance, communications support, photographic coverage, and an emergency management officer for coordination with regional FEMA officials.

(e) As a minimum, ensure SONAC training is provided for the directors of operations and support, JEOD and NETOPS training for EOD, and NETOPS training for appropriate RTF personnel. The senior radiation health officer (SRHO), alternate SRHO, and the Radiation Safety Advisor (RSA) assigned to the RTF shall have completed either the SONAC or Nuclear Hazard Training Course (NHTC) prior to assignment. Ensure technical proficiency of firefighters, NETOPS personnel, and other technical elements that comprise the RTF.

(f) Provide appropriate follow-on OPREP-3 reports in accordance with reference (p).

(g) Provide command legal assistance and public affairs guidance.

(h) Determine the requirements for outside assistance and notify the NMCC.

(i) Coordinate logistics support with national, Fleet, and U.S. Navy command centers per enclosures (3) and (8).

(j) Coordinate annual RTF exercises as specified in paragraph (10)(g) above including participation of specialized teams from other services/agencies.

(k) Conduct an annual review of plans, procedures, and capabilities.

(13) IRF Commanders

(a) Maintain a trained force to perform the functions addressed here. An example of a nominal ashore IRF is provided in enclosure (8), Annex (A). Plans and training programs will be developed and coordinated with the RTF Commander to ensure effective IRF operation.

(b) Upon notification of an accident or incident involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components, evaluate the situation to determine if the requirements of this

directive apply. If a potential nuclear weapon accident or significant incident has occurred, initiate appropriate initial phone and message (OPREP-3) notification of the event in accordance with references (a) and (p). Make initial notification and provide advice for protecting life, property, and the environment to State and local authorities in accordance with the FRERP.

(c) Assume immediate military control at the accident scene and take such action, within limits of their authority and capability, as may be necessary to minimize the initial effects of an accident or incident.

(d) Perform duties as delineated in reference (c) and enclosure (8) of this instruction, as well as amplifying instructions issued by the appropriate Fleet CINC and RTF Commander. These duties include provision for:

1. Firefighting.

2. Rescue and medical operations.

3. Security operations, that may include establishment of an NDA.

(e) Upon relief, assist the RTF Commander, as directed.

(14) DON Nuclear Weapon Capable Activities listed in reference (q) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Units/Detachments

(a) Maintain detailed nuclear weapon accident response plans and directives. At a minimum, these plans/directives will include applicable procedures outlined in this instruction as amplified by Unified Combatant Command, Fleet, Type, or System Commanders. Directives are to be tailored to the individual command and should address the interface with supporting Navy commands and other DoD and civil agencies. Reference (c) and enclosure (8) should be used as a guide to develop procedures.

(b) Per reference (r) update the Nuclear Accident Response Capabilities Listing (NARCL) annually or upon change of capabilities.

9. Action

a. Commanders shall prepare plans or directives consistent with the provisions of this instruction to ensure DON has the ability to quickly and safely respond to a nuclear weapon accident, when required.

b. All naval Fleet and force activities will inform the JNACC of their team and organizational capabilities to respond to requests for assistance to nuclear accidents and significant incidents. These reports (DD 2325) are to be submitted in accordance with reference (r) when a capability is achieved, discontinued, or changed, and annually as of

1 November. Reference (r) is updated by the JNACC annually. The report shall be submitted directly to Director, Defense Special Weapons Agency, ATTN: Operations Center Branch (CCOP), 6801 Telegraph Road, Alexandria, VA 22310-3398, or fax to DSN 221-7366, commercial (703) 325-7366.

10. Reports. The reporting requirements contained in this directive are exempt from reports control by SECNAVINST 5214.2B.

11. Form. DD 2325 (8-90), Nuclear Accident Response Capability Report, may be reproduced locally from reference (r) or requested by contacting the Operations Center, Defense Special Weapons Agency at (703) 325-2102.

WILLIAM J. HANCOCK
VICE ADMIRAL, USN
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS REQUIREMENTS

1. Purpose. To implement DoD Directive 5230.16 of 20 December 1993, Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs (PA) guidance, reference (b). All nuclear weapon accident response activities will comply with the requirements of reference (b).

2. Discussion

a. A nuclear weapon accident, whether in a remote or populated area, has immediate public impact. Within hours, or minutes, of the accident, news media will be at the scene and local citizens will seek information as to how the accident affects them. Given public apprehension and anticipated widespread news coverage of the accident or incident, a dynamic, comprehensive public affairs program must be rapidly implemented to ensure the credibility of the response effort.

b. Commanders at all levels are responsible for monitoring public understanding, identifying public concerns, and executing public affairs and community relations activities. These functions are usually delegated to the command's Public Affairs Officer (PAO).

(1) It is generally U.S. Government policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at a specific activity unless public safety concerns dictate otherwise. Further, most information on nuclear weapons and their storage locations is classified.

(2) In the event of loss, seizure, or theft of a nuclear weapon or component or seizure of a nuclear weapons storage site, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)) shall release information. This does not apply outside the United States, its territories, and possessions where specific Government agreements exist for the release of this information.

3. Action

a. In a nuclear weapon accident occurring in the United States, its territories, or possessions, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)) and the IRF/RTF Commander are required to confirm to the general public the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components, when necessary, in the interest of public safety or to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm. Notification of public authorities also is required if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or other danger posed by the weapon or its components.

b. During a nuclear weapon accident overseas, the ASD(PA) or the Unified Combatant Commander, with concurrence of the foreign government through the appropriate Chief of U.S. Mission, may confirm the presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components in the

interest of public safety. Notification of public authorities also is required if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or other danger posed by the weapon or its components.

c. The Chief of Naval Operations shall, in coordination with the Chief of Information (CHINFO):

(1) Immediately establish liaison with public affairs officers at OASD(PA), NMCC, Department of Energy (DOE), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA), Joint Information Center (JIC), and other services from the news desk at CHINFO. In addition, the Department of State PAO shall be notified and consulted for accidents overseas or when the potential exists that contamination may cross the borders of the United States.

(2) Coordinate media briefings by appropriate Navy officials; coordinate with OASD(PA) in the preparation of press releases for national-level release.

(3) Ensure that the Navy IRF or RTF Commander is advised, through appropriate operations centers, of national-level media activity addressing Navy accident response and recovery operations.

d. Fleet Commanders in Chief shall:

(1) Notify CHINFO, OASD(PA), and the Unified Combatant Command PAO of a nuclear weapons accident or significant incident and provide timely and accurate data regarding emergent events as they become available.

(2) Make provisions for regional FEMA, DOE, Unified Combatant Command, and service public affairs representation on the established Crisis Action Team to ensure that coordinated public affairs guidance is available at all levels of command.

e. Fleet Commanders in Chief, in coordination with CHINFO and Unified Combatant Command PAO, shall ensure that the following public affairs issues are addressed in their contingency plans:

(1) Public affairs responsibilities outlined in reference (b).

(2) Public affairs procedures to be followed by Navy IRF or RTF Commanders. These procedures shall be in the form of a checklist and shall include the items contained in reference (b).

(3) Adequate public affairs manning, communications, and logistic support for response to a nuclear weapons accident or significant incident.

(4) Contingency public information releases as contained in reference (b). Actual releases should be tailored to the existing situation, as necessary.

(5) Annual training briefings on the public affairs aspects of a nuclear weapons accident. This training should include the policy guidance contained in reference (b), as well as the command's implementing guidance.

f. IRF and RTF Commanders shall ensure the following public affairs issues are addressed in their contingency plans:

(1) Procedures for obtaining public affairs guidance from OASD(PA) and/or executing exceptions to policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons. These procedures should be in the form of a checklist and should contain the following:

(a) OASD(PA) and CHINFO duty officer telephone numbers. The following OASD(PA) numbers are manned on a 24-hour basis: DSN 227-5131 or commercial (703) 697-5131. CHINFO: Duty hours, phone DSN 227-7391 or commercial (703) 697-7391; after hours, duty phone (703) 697-5342 (that will provide current duty officer name and home phone information), cellular (703) 408-0066, or pager (703) 514-5619. The CHINFO duty officer provides contact information to the OPNAV Duty Captain upon setting the watch.

(b) Procedures for announcing that the scene of an accident or significant incident have been declared a National Defense Area (NDA). Authority for this declaration is the Federal police power of the Department of Defense (DoD) that is inherent in the responsibilities charged to DoD under the various statutory provisions dealing with the development, storage, and use of nuclear weapons. Policy and guidance are provided in references (g) and (h).

(c) Procedures for establishing a JIC for all nuclear weapon accidents or significant incidents occurring off Federal property and for accidents or significant incidents occurring on Federal property when the public is, or may be, affected. The JIC should provide for representation from and communication facilities for DoD, DOE, FEMA, and State and local public affairs officials. As directed by the IRF or RTF Commander, the senior Navy public affairs representative shall develop and coordinate all media releases from the JIC. The IRF or RTF Commander is responsible for the technical accuracy and security classification of all media releases.

(d) Procedures for activating a Community Emergency Action Team (CEAT) to respond to public concerns and to keep civil officials informed. All information to be given to the public by the CEAT shall be approved by the RTF Commander.

(2) Public affairs manning requirements including communications and logistic support.

(3) Public Affairs coordination with the Principal Legal Advisor to address the legality of security force actions and the viability of the NDA, and other issues addressed in enclosure (7).

(4) Sample contingency news releases per reference (b).

(5) News media support in the JIC.

JOINT NUCLEAR ACCIDENT COORDINATING CENTER (JNACC)

1. Purpose

a. The Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC) was established in accordance with a joint Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Energy (DOE) agreement. JNACC was established to assist the National Military Command Center (NMCC), service operations centers, DOE, and civil authorities in the execution of their responsibilities during an accident or incident involving radioactive material.

b. The military services, DSWA, and DOE provide JNACC with information necessary to maintain records regarding the location and capability of specialized units and teams that can be employed for emergency radiological accident and significant incident operations.

2. Discussion. The Navy's responsibility with respect to the joint agreement is to establish procedures to ensure that the JNACC is advised of all radiological accidents and incidents. JNACC's principal task and functions are to:

a. Maintain current information from DOE, DSWA, and the services as to location and availability of specialized DoD and DOE teams or organizations capable of responding to accidents or significant incidents involving radioactive material.

b. Receive notification of accidents or incidents and requests for assistance.

c. Request assistance, as necessary, from DoD or DOE.

d. Provide accident or incident information to appropriate commands and agencies.

e. Obtain all available information regarding the radioactive material involved in the accident or incident and disseminate to response forces at the site.

f. Refer public queries to the Joint Information Center (JIC) established by the service or agency having primary command responsibility at the accident site.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT GUIDANCE

1. Purpose. To provide guidance on logistics support peculiar to a nuclear weapon accident or incident. This guidance supplements that contained in reference (c).

2. Discussion

a. Response to a nuclear weapon accident will be of the highest priority and resources from DoD, DOE, and other Federal, State, and local agencies can be expected to arrive at the accident site quickly. The extent and specific requirements for these resources will depend on the nature of the accident, its location, environmental conditions, the number of personnel involved, and the duration of the response operation. Detailed information on the composition of the critical response resources are provided in enclosure (8). To support the rapid influx of personnel, pending completion of a base camp, give immediate consideration to the use of assets near the accident site, such as National Guard armories, gymnasiums, and hotels, to provide billeting, messing, and a supply point for response support. Logistical support of the response to a nuclear accident will continue until completion of site restoration; the responsible logistics officer must plan accordingly.

b. Activities providing requested assistance to a nuclear weapon accident will pay costs initially incurred from existing available funds. Activities may request subsequent reimbursement from the service or agency having physical possession of the nuclear weapon at the time of the accident. Reimbursement will be for cost incurred above normal operating expenses that are directly chargeable to, and caused by, the accident.

c. The logistics officer designated by the IRF or RTF Commander for forces responding to a nuclear weapon accident should:

(1) Conduct pre-accident planning to identify the location and availability of items that are not organic to the response organization and that may be a limiting factor in the response effort.

(2) Immediately upon notification of a nuclear weapon accident, request assignment of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) project code from the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board, through the RTF Commander to the Joint Staff. Once approved, all response-related requisitions should contain this code. Requisitions with a JCS project code will be ranked above all other requisitions with the same priority.

(3) Identify installations near the accident site and contact appropriate authorities to determine support capabilities and notify them of potential requirements. Establish procedures for rapidly acquiring support and supplies from these installations. If the nearest installation is

SECURITY GUIDANCE

1. Purpose. To provide guidance for planning and conducting security operations at the scene of a nuclear weapon accident or incident.

2. Discussion

a. The presence of nuclear weapons or components at an accident site requires immediate implementation of an effective security program. When an accident involving a weapon in DON custody results in the loss of control of the weapon or classified components off the DoD installation, security assistance may be required from civil authorities until sufficient military security forces arrive on scene to establish a National Defense Area (NDA) to secure classified materials. In all cases, close coordination with civil authorities will be essential throughout the accident response effort.

b. All Initial Response Forces/ Response Task Force (IRF/RTF) commanders should include a security annex in response plans outlining procedures to be followed during a nuclear weapon accident or incident. References (c) and (m) provide guidance for planning and conducting security operations at the scene of a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident. The complexity and scope of security planning will depend on the existing resources of the command.

c. The timely application of a range of emergency procedures is critical to the successful prosecution of a nuclear weapon accident response. It is imperative, therefore, that advanced planning and training be conducted between firefighters, security forces, medical, and EOD personnel to ensure that emergency procedures are allowed to proceed unimpeded while appropriate weapon security is maintained.

d. In addition to the guidance provided in references (c) and (m) security plans should identify the requirement to:

(1) Establish a security perimeter including a single Entry Control Point (ECP). The ECP should be located at, or near, but not to interfere with, the Contamination Control Station (CCS).

(2) Establish entry control procedures.

(3) Establish entry control logs that contain, as a minimum:

(a) Names.

(b) Social security numbers.

(c) Parent organization.

(4) Establish an on-site security command center.

(5) Establish procedures and ensure security personnel are briefed on the limits of their authority for enforcing the security boundaries, apprehending versus arresting civilian personnel, using deadly force, and dealing with potential tactics the news media and civilian populace might use in their quest for information.

(6) Establish procedures for recovery of Government material from unauthorized personnel.

(7) Establish procedures for briefing and debriefing personnel.

(8) Establish procedures for traffic control.

(9) Establish procedures for marking and securing the NDA.

(10) Coordinate with the legal and public affairs officers on the response force staff, and Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to address the legality of security force action and viability of the NDA.

e. IRFs should maintain a security element and equipment to control an accident site, including perimeter security, entry control, and protection of classified material. Security personnel should have, and be trained and prepared to deploy with weapons, ammunition, cold weather gear, protective masks, radios, canteens, and helmets, as necessary.

f. The RTF should be prepared to provide additional security personnel to enhance the security of the site. Members of the IRF Security Force will likely be absorbed into the RTF Security Force structure. Sufficient personnel are required to maintain security on a 24-hour basis without degradation of the security posture. Close coordination with civil authorities will be required to ensure proper control of the situation if an NDA is established. All security personnel should be properly equipped and trained to minimize contamination of themselves and equipment.

GENERAL FIREFIGHTING GUIDANCE

1. Purpose. To provide general guidance for combating fires involving nuclear weapons or radioactive material. Fires should be fought in accordance with references (c) and (i), as well as other pertinent Navy directives.

2. Discussion

a. Nuclear weapons directly involved in a fire present no greater explosive hazard than the quantity of high explosives involved; however, they do present additional hazards because of the radioactive, toxic, and caustic materials contained in warheads. To reduce these hazards, personnel assigned to fight a fire involving nuclear weapons must be properly trained and use appropriate equipment and procedures.

b. Fires in nuclear weapon facilities or during weapon transport operations, in proximity to, but not directly involving weapons, pose little, if any, risk of detonating, or dispersing explosives or hazardous substances, or creating a radiological hazard from the weapon. Firefighters should prosecute this type of fire as they would any other similar structure or vehicle fire.

c. In all cases, emergency response procedures must take priority over the security and Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) requirements normally associated with nuclear weapon programs. It is imperative that advanced planning and training be conducted between firefighters, security forces, medical, and EOD personnel to ensure that emergency procedures are allowed to proceed unimpeded while appropriate weapon security is maintained.

d. For accidents/incidents occurring outside Federal boundaries, it is possible that civil law enforcement and firefighting agencies will be the first on the scene. It is essential, therefore, that immediate contact and rapid on-scene military presence be established to advise these agencies of potential hazards.

e. Personnel involved in fighting a fire involving nuclear weapons will continue their efforts as long as there is a reasonable expectation of (1) preventing loss of life or serious injury, or (2) preventing the spread of contamination.

f. If the Initial Response Force (IRF) Commander or senior fire official determines that fighting a fire ashore is fruitless or endangering the lives of firefighters, the decision to cease firefighting should be made and personnel should be withdrawn to a safe position. Efforts to extinguish a fire on board ship must continue until the fire is extinguished.

g. Control of contamination, such as the flow of potentially contaminated water, should be a secondary consideration during firefighting actions.

DECONTAMINATION GUIDANCE

1. Purpose. To provide guidance concerning personnel monitoring and decontamination procedures to be employed at a nuclear weapon accident site. This enclosure will be supplemented by publication of the DoD Manual 3150.8-M, Radiological Response Procedures (RRP) Manual.

2. Discussion

a. Reference (c) provides standardized general procedures and guidelines for Contamination Control Station (CCS) operations, shipboard radiological monitoring, contamination control, and medical requirements resulting from a nuclear weapons accident. References (j) and (k) provide Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) guidance for the initial exposure assessment and management and treatment of individuals who are irradiated or externally or internally contaminated.

b. Monitoring and decontamination of personnel is normally performed at the CCS. A trained and qualified team leader should supervise personnel monitoring and decontamination operations at the CCS to ensure that proper procedures are consistently performed and the spread of contamination is strictly controlled.

c. Immediately following an accident, severely injured personnel should be removed for medical treatment (including monitoring and decontamination) without being monitored for contamination at the CCS; however, care must still be taken to minimize the spread of contamination. Although it must be anticipated that such action may spread contamination to an ambulance or medical facility, it is unlikely to pose a significant threat to medical personnel and is appropriate whenever life threatening injuries exist. If required, fatalities may likewise be removed to a hospital or morgue; however, in these cases, the potentially contaminated deceased should be wrapped by some expedient method (blankets, body bags, etc.) to reduce the spread of contamination. In all cases, receiving medical/ambulance personnel must be advised of the potential for contamination.

d. Personnel with less serious injuries should be monitored and decontaminated at the CCS to the extent injuries permit. Contamination should be a secondary consideration if wounds require immediate medical attention. Corpsmen and medically trained personnel treating the wounded should be monitored frequently to prevent them from contaminating others and their medical supplies and equipment.

LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

1. Purpose. To provide requirements, identify legal resources, and establish minimum standards to be followed by Initial Response Force (IRF) and Response Task Force (RTF) Commanders, command legal officers, staff judge advocates, and the Office of General Counsel (OGC).

2. Discussion

a. The responsibilities and procedures outlined in this enclosure and reference (c) are applicable to all naval activities and should be used in the development and execution of plans to provide prompt legal support to the IRF and RTF Commanders.

b. A nuclear weapon accident will present many complex legal issues for both the IRF and RTF Commanders. Both, in their turn, represent the U.S. Government to the general public, State, and local officials. Legal issues arising may include:

(1) Limits on the use of military personnel and equipment to maintain order or assist civil authorities on nonmilitary property.

(2) Restricting the general public or assuming exclusive control of private property (either real or personal) for purposes of public safety or protection of classified material.

(3) Questions of Federal supremacy where Federal interests are in conflict with State or local interests.

(4) Recovering lost military equipment or classified material from civilian personnel.

(5) Processing claims against the United States for personal injury, death, and loss or damage to property.

c. Naval Judge Advocates and OGC command counsel should assist in developing contingency plans and related documents and should be assigned to the IRF and RTF as the Principal Legal Advisor. Advanced planning will permit the IRF or RTF Commander to anticipate legal problems and will facilitate assigning legal responsibilities in the event of an accident or incident.

3. Action. The Principal Legal Advisor shall:

a. Ensure a claims processing facility is established at the accident site and adequate support personnel, equipment, and claims forms are available.

b. Establish channels for coordinating technical legal matters with higher headquarters and other Federal Departments and agencies.

c. Organize and supervise the legal element at the accident site, including the claims processing facility.

d. Review operational plans to ensure they meet legal requirements, particularly in the areas of security, identification of installation status under 42 U.S.C. sec 11004, identification of appropriate State and local officials to receive notification, and documentation of facts for use in potential claims and litigation.

e. Coordinate with, and advise, the public affairs officer (PAO) and other appropriate responding elements on the legality of security force actions and viability of the National Defense Area (NDA).

f. Ensure that preliminary and follow-up reports required by 42 U.S.C. sec 9603, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and 11004 Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA), and 10 U.S.C. sec 2705 Defense Environmental Restoration Procedures (DERP), as applicable, are submitted by the IRF or RTF Commander as soon as possible. (42 U.S.C. sec 9603 - CERCLA specifies the requirement to notify the National Response Center of the release of a hazardous substance. 42 U.S.C. sec 11004 -EPCRA indicates the requirement to notify the State and local emergency planning committee of the release of a hazardous substance. 10 U.S.C. sec 2705 - DERP requires that DoD notify EPA, State, and local authorities of a release or threatened releases of hazardous substances at a DoD facility.)

NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT AND SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT PLANNING AND RESPONSE GUIDANCE

1. Purpose. To provide guidance concerning procedures to be included in nuclear accident or incident response directives and bills. This guidance is applicable to those nuclear weapons capable activities listed in reference (q) and other activities designated by Fleet Commanders.

2. Discussion. Reference (c) contains procedures to be followed at the outset of, and during, a nuclear accident or incident. The procedures are flexible and may be modified as necessary to accommodate any nuclear weapon accident or incident. For shore activities identified above, the nuclear weapon response plans should include provisions for using applicable resources available from DoD, DOE, DSWA, FEMA, and other organizations as outlined in reference (s) and annexes (A) through (C). For afloat units, plans should be included in the damage control bill.

Note

The guidance provided here and in reference (c) were developed consistent with normal peacetime operations. During periods of advanced defense conditions (DEFCONs) or actual combat, DON commanders, commanding officers, and officers in charge will use these procedures consistent with prevailing operational requirements.

Fleet CINCs should ensure that designated activities develop nuclear weapon accident/incident plans incorporating the minimum standards contained in reference (c) and that the plans are coordinated with the appropriate DON and non-DON agencies and commands. These plans should be reviewed and updated at least annually.

a. Within the constraints of mission assignment, nuclear accident plans should include the following at a minimum:

(1) Establishment of a Command Duty Officer/Officer of the Day emergency action plan detailing procedures to be followed when notified of:

(a) A nuclear accident or incident within their geographic jurisdiction.

(b) A request for assistance from the NMCC, NCC, JNACC, Unified Combatant Commander, or other services or agencies.

(2) Procedures for assuming initial command at the scene of a nuclear accident or incident. These procedures should include provisions for:

(a) Providing immediate physical security for classified material including provisions for requesting support from civil law enforcement agencies and assets from other services, as necessary.

(b) Establishing timely communications including:

1. Nuclear accident reporting under reference (p).

2. Telephone (DSN or commercial), radio, or land-line communications between the accident scene and chain of command.

3. Effective communications with local, State, and FEMA authorities.

4. Effective communications with response elements.

(c) Providing emergency medical and fire assistance including provisions for requesting support from civilian hospitals and fire departments.

(d) Providing Protective Actions Recommendations, in conjunction with FEMA and other Federal agencies when practical, to State and local authorities.

(e) Assisting the IRF or RTF Commander of an accident scene by providing or obtaining:

1. Transportation.

2. Messing and billeting facilities, military (afloat or ashore) or commercial, for a minimum of 150 persons. Use annexes (A) through (C) for planning guidance.

3. Medical facilities and personnel, i.e., corpsmen, radiological health specialists, hospital facilities, etc., as available within their AOR.

4. Laundry facilities (military or civilian).

5. Administrative support.

6. Secure communications equipment (voice and digital), including ship or Fleet Marine Force (FMF) field communications, if necessary.

7. Assistance in identifying augmenting forces and material via the NMCC.

(3) Procedures for the training of command personnel in nuclear weapons accident response.

(4) Public affairs and legal requirements as outlined in enclosures (1) and (7) of this instruction.

b. In addition to the requirements outlined above, all activities assigned a nuclear mission should ensure that the following are incorporated in nuclear weapon accident response plans:

(1) Procedures to be followed during routine storage, maintenance, handling, logistics movement, and operational readiness maneuver scenarios.

(2) Procedures for submitting a Nuclear Accident Response Capabilities Report (DD 2325) in accordance with reference (r) and this instruction.

(3) Procedures for rendering assistance, when requested, to other service, Federal, or civil activities involved in a nuclear accident or incident.

(4) A comprehensive exercise program of credible nuclear weapon and radiological accidents. As a minimum, selected scenarios should be exercised quarterly with each major area of accident response exercised periodically.

c. As specified in this instruction, the IRF components will be predesignated and will be derived from available resources at, or near, the accident site; however, the composition of an RTF will be determined by the level of severity of the accident. Examples of a nominal IRF (shore) and RTF are provided in annexes (A) and (B). The actual IRF and RTF organizations developed should be compatible to the State and local Incident Command System (ICS) used at that locale.

d. RTF plans should include provisions for the establishment of a Joint Operations Center (JOC), Joint Information Center (JIC), and Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC) that are addressed further in Annex (C). IRF Commanders also should be cognizant of the functions and requirements of these activities.

Annexes: A. Initial Response Task Force (IRF)
B. Response Task Force (RTF)
C. RTF Joint Coordination Centers

INITIAL RESPONSE FORCE (IRF)

1. Purpose. To identify nominal ashore response forces required to take emergency response actions to maintain command and control of the accident/incident site, pending arrival of the Response Task Force (RTF). Composition of the IRF includes all DON personnel (military, civilian, and contract). The number of personnel involved will be proportional to the severity of the accident.

2. Discussion. IRF tasks include:

   a. Rescue operations

   b. Accident site security

   c. Firefighting

   d. Initiation of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) operations

   e. Radiological monitoring and control

   f. Establishment of command, control, and communications

   g. Public affairs, including establishment of a Joint Information Center (JIC)

3. Nominal Composition. Estimated number of IRF personnel: 114 to 245; broken down as follows (see Figure 1):

   a. Command and Control Center (includes Commander and staff)—5 to 12

   b. Special Staff (personnel, liaison, public affairs, and logistics specialists)—13 to 15

   c. Communications and Services, 8 to 12, includes:

      (1) Team Leader—1

      (2) Plotters/recorders—2 to 4

      (3) Communications personnel—5 to 7

d. Emergency and NETOPS Elements, 64 to 118, includes:

(1) Command Post—7 to 9

(2) EOD—5 to 6

(3) Fire and Rescue—9 to 16

(4) NETOPS Personnel—18 to 36

(5) Security Forces—22 to 26

(6) Medical/Clinical Personnel—3 to 25

(7) Additional personnel to augment medical and security, as required

e. General Support, 24 to 88, includes:

(1) Engineering Services (includes support to communications infrastructure)—10 to 25

(2) Transportation—5 to 35

(3) Personnel and Welfare Services—1 to 20

(4) Logistics Support, supply personnel, and billeting services—8 or more.



KEY

Solid lines denote command or operational control.
Dash lines indicate coordination.
Organizations represented by dash lines are RTF elements.
Non-DON organizations are shown with double line border.

Figure 1. Nominal IRF

RESPONSE TASK FORCE (RTF)

1. Purpose. To identify nominal response forces required to deploy to the site of a nuclear weapon accident/incident.

2. Discussion

a. The Response Task Force (RTF) is a Unified Combatant Commander asset that will be deployed in whole or in part as the accident or incident situation dictates. The RTF will continue operations to mitigate the affects of the accident and conduct both on-site and off-site protective actions and recovery. DON involvement with other Federal, State, and local activities will normally increase following RTF arrival, particularly if contamination extends beyond the boundaries of the affected naval facility.

b. The RTF Commander should coordinate safety aspects of the response through the Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC) and public affairs through the Joint Information Center (JIC). Security and legal issues arising from the accident, as well as operational, administrative, and logistical concerns, are generally controlled through the Joint Operations Center (JOC). The Defense Nuclear Advisory Team (DNAT) advises and assists the RTF Commander.

c. Off-site activities, such as the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), will normally be established by non-DoD elements to expedite the recovery and restoration of affected civilian areas. These activities require a DON liaison from the RTF to provide the necessary coordination to effectively mitigate the effects of the accident. The nominal RTF (Figure 2) is similar in structure and composition to the ICS that is used for State and local emergency management.

3. Nominal Composition. The composition of the RTF may incorporate elements of the IRF to meet the personnel requirements identified below. The RTF also may be augmented by special teams from DON, other DoD assets, and Federal civilian agencies. As shown below, the estimated number of DON individuals forming the nucleus of the RTF is 217. With the addition of non-Navy elements, as many as 300 to 2,000 personnel may be involved.

a. Command and Control, 50, includes:

(1) RTF On-Scene Commander, designated flag officer—1

(2) Deputy Commander *—1

(3) Operations Officer—1

(4) Emergency Response Coordinator* and Emergency Response Unit (ERU) Operations—6 (Coordinates with civil authority elements of the response ICS.)

(5) Legal Advisor and two assistants—3

(6) Public Affairs Officer and three assistants—4

(7) Chaplain and one assistant—2

(8) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Liaison—1

(9) Communications and Control—8

(10) JHEC Liaison—1

(11) Support Director and staff—16

(12) Liaison Staff (Congressional, Protocol, civil authorities)—6

b. Facilities and Maintenance (includes mess personnel)—17, includes:

(1) Facilities and Maintenance—7

(2) Mess Specialists—5

(3) Logistics Specialists—5

c. Security Forces* —50

d. Fire and Rescue*—16

e. EOD* Personnel—6

f. NETOPS*—50

g. Medical Radiation/Decontamination, 8 (excludes supporting medical facility staff)

h. JHEC, 20 DON personnel (for further details, see annex (C))

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* May include member(s) of IRF



KEY

Solid lines denote command or operational control.
Dash lines indicate coordination.
Boxes with double line borders represent non-DON activities.

Figure 2. Nominal RTF

RTF JOINT COORDINATION CENTERS

1. Purpose. To provide an overview of significant jointly staffed nodes of the nuclear weapon accident/incident Response Task Force (RTF) organization.

2. Discussion

a. Joint Operations Center (JOC). The JOC serves as the primary coordination center for the RTF Commander. It is the focal point for command and control of on-site operations and coordination of actions with supporting activities, both on and off site including the following:

(1) Submission of required reports, including those submitted to the Unified Combatant Commander (UCC), NMCC, and other reports discussed in this instruction. This does not include press releases that are coordinated through the Joint Information Center.

(2) Weapon recovery coordination and planning. Weapon recovery is coordinated with the Department of Energy (DOE) Accident Response Group (ARG). The ARG is comprised, in part, of nuclear specialists and scientists who assist and advise the EOD team in recovery operations.

(3) Coordination with RTF elements and supporting Federal activities. Members of the RTF Staff and Special Staff and Defense Nuclear Advisory Team (DNAT) function in the JOC. Liaison personnel from the legal claims office, the Joint Hazard Evaluation Center, as well as non-Navy off-site support such as the Disaster Field Office (DFO) will operate from the JOC to ensure coordination with the RTF Commander. Additionally, the Emergency Response Unit will operate from the JOC to effect coordination with the State and local Incident Command System.

b. Joint Information Center (JIC). The JIC should serve as the focal point for development of information released to public and press as authorized by the RTF Commander. The facility will provide for the coordination between the RTF Commander, Federal, State, and local authorities, as well as the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD (PA)). To allow for access to non-naval activities, the JIC should be located outside the Security and National Defense Area perimeter.

c. Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC). The JEHC serves as the RTF Commander's central element for establishing and administering occupational health and safety programs (including radiological hazards) implemented to protect all on-site personnel responding to, or on-site personnel affected by a nuclear weapon accident. Information provided by the JHEC is essential during the decisionmaking processes for weapons recovery that could affect on-site workers' health and safety and has an off-site impact, as well. The JHEC provides the RTF Commander with a centralized source of current on-site health and safety information. JHEC

information is shared with the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) to assist them in establishing appropriate and effective off-site actions in response to the accident.

(1) The senior Navy radiation health officer or radiation safety advisor on the RTF should establish and direct operation of the JHEC until relieved by a designated representative from Commander, Navy Sea Systems Command (COMNAVSEASYSCOM) (SEA-07R) and shall then serve as the liaison between the RTF Commander and the JHEC Director.

(2) DOE ARG health and safety response personnel report to and coordinate their efforts through the JHEC. For information concerning supporting elements available to the ARG, see reference (c).

(3) The JHEC is the single control point for the RTF Commander for off-site information through liaison with the FRMAC. The FRMAC is a DOE-managed center established to coordinate radiological monitoring and assessment support to State and local governments. The DOE Off-Site Technical Director is responsible for the FRMAC. Responsibility for FRMAC operations may be transferred to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at a time mutually agreed upon by DOE and EPA.

(4) Elements of the DNAT are located in the JHEC to advise and assist the RTF Commander on matters relating to radiological health and safety issues. The Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute's Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team (MRAT) is such an asset. The MRAT can be present or contacted by telephone for state-of-the-art medical radiobiology advice.